Ben Fallaw, associate professor of Latin American studies
Ben Fallaw, associate professor of Latin American studies, recently published a book, Religion and State Formation in Postrevolutionary Mexico, that explores the ways the state was formed after the Mexican Revolution—including the emergence of the political party that would become the dominant PRI. After a dozen years out of power, the PRI is back and proposing changes that could reinvigorate the Mexican economy, with ramifications for the United States. Fallaw spoke to Colby Managing Editor Gerry Boyle ’78 about changes taking place in Mexico.
They’re back. What did you think of the PRI’s resurgence under President Enrique Peña Nieto?
First of all it was just surprise. I was there in 2000 when they lost. I followed the news closely and I’ve been back every summer since. I’ve been in Mexico just about every summer since 1994. So there was a feeling that the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] was done in 2000. And that it might well disintegrate entirely. What happened was not so much the PRI’s astuteness or Machiavellian strategy; it was the inability of the right-of-center PAN [National Action Party] to rule effectively. The growth of violence with the cartels is the predominant issue. But it’s an economy, like ours, that seems to produce more inequality along with growth, which is also a very serious concern.
So how did the PRI take advantage of that?
On the drug count, their genius was silence. They just said, “We’re going to adopt another strategy that isn’t based on sending the army in. Exactly what that is, we aren’t sure.” But there’s been a decline in some parts of Mexico in terms of violence. So they can point to that and take credit. On the second count, the economy, they are moving to fix the education system, which is a real serious problem. And they’re talking about taking on huge cartels—which some economists argue are more dangerous than the drug cartels—which is the cell phone companies owned by Carlos Slim, the wealthiest man in the world. Second is the domination of two large media companies. Peña Neito is also talking about other economic reforms, maybe privatization of oil, which would be a huge step.
What are the chances of him being able to pull all of this off?
I think the most important thing for the PRI is to win. They don’t want to leave power. And I think there is an understanding that they’re going to turn on some of their friends in the business community in order to come up with a series of reforms that promote growth in a more sustainable way without booms and busts.
And there are busts?
There’s still forty-four percent in poverty, ten percent in extreme poverty. Those are huge numbers in a country that in some ways is doing pretty well economically.
Can the PRI run solely on popular support?
They would say yes. Whether this is a superficial reform has yet to be seen, but I think they understand that competing with the Left means promoting a sort of a fair deal, something like Teddy Roosevelt tried to do here by taming some of the excesses of capitalism.
Is it mostly talk at this point?
The education reform has gone past talk. [Peña Nieto] is moving to take a census of every school in Mexico, find out who’s the principal, how many teachers are there. Do they have teaching degrees? There’s just a lack of knowledge on the part of the government of itself.
Peña Nieto had the head of the national teachers union arrested, right?
He arrested Esther Gordillo. She was corrupt on a scale that’s hard to imagine, in terms of just piling up everything from Gucci bags to luxury apartments.
And a private jet.
A jet. Art work. It was a kind of excessive consumption that outraged a lot of Mexicans. And she opposed the president on education reforms, so cynics would say it was a way to score political points and implement these reforms.
Enrique Peña Nieto (center), president of Mexico and member of PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
AP Photo/Alexandre Meneghini
The rampant poverty—aren’t most Americans unaware of that?
Even if you’ve seen poverty in the Appalachians or inner cities in parts of the United States, the scale of poverty in rural Mexico and some urban areas—it’s just staggering. You see hundreds of children in the streets instead of in school. Lack of running water. Diseases that are easily preventable. Illiteracy. And then there’s the image Americans see on TV of beaches and pyramids.
The other image we see is dead bodies, the victims of drug cartels. It seems like a war zone. Some even warn Mexico could become a failed state.
It’s not like that. Mexico has a huge middle class. It has a free press. Parts of the law enforcement system, particularly in Mexico City, have managed to get somewhat better. The cartels are dangerous, but they’re not seeking to overthrow the government. This is not the Taliban.
You can get that impression from the news, though. Of total anarchy.
Part of it feeds into the immigration debate here, this notion that we have to seal our borders. I just saw a report that the drug cartels are planting people in the U.S. It’s just not true. It’s complete fabrication. I think it’s mostly that bureaucrats are worried about budget cuts, and stories like this get attention. We’re talking about it, so it got our attention, right?
These PRI economic reforms—how do they affect U.S. immigration policy?
The biggest effect on immigration policy is the decline of the American economy, so there’s been a very large reduction in undocumented immigration. And I honestly don’t see that reversing anytime soon.
Because the jobs aren’t here in America?
The jobs aren’t here. There’s some recovery in the construction industry, but I’ve seen no indication that people are going to start crossing the border in large numbers.
And in the long term?
If Mexico were to fix its education system, were to have a higher level of growth, one that reaches that forty-four percent and the ten percent, the poorest of the poor—that, over the long run, would dry up the pool of immigrants. Frankly, the demographic momentum has shifted. Mexico went from ten million people in 1910 to maybe a hundred million people in 1990. Now Mexicans are starting to decrease family size, and that eventually is going to start to show in structural unemployment dropping. Especially if the education system turns around and people in very poor rural areas, which is traditionally where immigrants have come from, start to see more economic opportunities at home.
So these reforms would lessen that pressure to leave Mexico for work.
Absolutely. And frankly, as China moves up the production scale and wants higher-paying, more value-added jobs, that’s a niche for Mexico, and its industry can start to recover. If its education system improves, with more English instruction, then Mexican companies are going to be better positioned to do business in the United States. I don’t think we’re ever going to see a large wave of immigration like we saw in the 1980s or ’70s. I don’t see the same factors being there. So I think any talk of so-called amnesty leading to another wave is just not realistic. The factors are just not there in Mexico.
The reasons to leave, you mean.
Right. The push factors. The pull factors here, also, are different.
And Mexico may have its own stronger economy.
Right. And I think the PRI will take credit for changes that are probably going to happen anyway in terms of demographics, China and its place in the world economy. These things are going to happen anyway, but the party in power is the one that will take credit for it, just as it would take the blame if things go bad.
So is it an optimistic time in Mexico then?
I think there is a guarded optimism about the new president. He was surrounded by groups from the old PRI in his campaign. In governing he seems to be distancing himself from them. If he actually is serious about reforming telecommunications, that suggests that he’s serious.
To take on the richest man in the world.
To take on the richest man in the world and his lawyers.
