MIDDLE EAST CONUNDRUM: “A RIDDLE, WRAPPED IN A MYSTERY, INSIDE AN ENIGMA”

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The region is in bad shape

- Region produces little with human value-added.
- Virtually no intra-regional trade – about 7 percent.
- Resistance to reforms → corruption, crony capitalism.
- Lack of basic freedoms and rights.
- Weak track record of democratization.
- Autocratic systems, monarchies, praetorian republics.
- Population growth → no jobs, food insecurity.
Middle East today

- Weak and failed states, governance crises.
- Collapse of traditional state system → dominance of the periphery and rise of non-state actors.
- Breakdown of borders → ungoverned spaces.
- Identity politics: From Nasser to Nasrallah.
- Arab Huma Development Reports.
U.S.-Iran confrontation: The burden of history
Iran’s nuclear and missile ambitions
Iran – JCPOA

Level of enrichment

Centrifuges: #/type
Size of stockpile

Enrichment at Fordow

Production of plutonium at Arak

Industrial-level enrichment at Natanz

Breakout timeline for producing weapons grade material for one bomb

Duration of the agreement

Transparency through: Monitoring, Inspection, Verification

Dispute resolution mechanism

Timeline/mechanics of sanctions relief/removal/snapback
White House Fact Sheet on the JCPOA

To ensure “breakout time” for a bomb is at least one year, Iran must:

- **For 10 years:** Reduce centrifuges by 2/3 and limit facilities enriching uranium; limit research on new centrifuges

- **For 15 years:** Reduce uranium stockpile by 97 percent; limit enrichment to 3.67 percent; and refrain from constructing new facilities; Reconfigure research reactor to cut production of plutonium by 90 percent; no new reactors

- **For 20 years:** Allow surveillance of all centrifuge production

- **For 25 years:** Allow monitoring of all uranium mines and mills; confine all purchase of nuclear technology to approved channel

- **Permanently:** Allow inspections of declared and suspect undeclared facilities; refrain from any work on nuclear weapons; refrain from reprocessing fuel to extract plutonium
Iran’s regional ambitions: The “Shi’a Crescent”

- 1982: Hezbollah was founded in Lebanon
- 1973: The beginning of political convergence between Shias and Alawites
- 2003: Shias came to power in Iraq
- 1979: Islamic Revolution in Iran

Map showing the percentage of Muslim population that is Shia in various countries:
- Lebanon: 45-55%
- Syria: 15-20%
- Iraq: 45-55%
- Iran: 90-95%
- Kuwait: 20-25%
- Bahrain: 65-75%
- Saudi Arabia: 10-15%
- Qatar: 10%
- UAE: 5-10%
- Oman: 10%
- Yemen: 35-40%

Source: Pew Research Center.
Trump withdraws from JCPOA → ‘maximum pressure’
Is U.S.-Iran ‘détente’ possible today? Not likely

- Pompeo’s 12 demands.
- Unstated U.S. goal of regime change.
- Iran’s demand that the U.S. not interfere in Iran’s internal affairs.
- U.S. demand that Iran not interfere in internal affairs of regional states.
- Iran demand that the U.S. remove unilateral sanctions.
- Israel as a factor in U.S. thinking.
The Israel-Palestine peace puzzle
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The Israeli dilemma

- Two state solution
- Jewish state
- One state solution
- 'Democratic occupation' not possible
- "Apartheid" Status quo
- Maintain post-1967 boundaries in West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem

Two state solution: Maintain post-1967 boundaries in West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem.
The Palestinian Dilemma

The Palestinians Historic Compromise  Trump’s Plan

1917  Historic Palestine
1937  Peel Commission Partition Plan
1947  UN Partition Plan
1967  Border Lines Endorsed by PLO in 1988 as a Historic Compromise for Peace
2020

These maps are for illustrative purposes only. Boundary representations are not authoritative.
The Trump plan is not the answer

• Palestinian state would constitute 84% of the 22% of the territory they claim.
• The state would comprise six non-contiguous cantons, surrounded by Israel.
• All Israeli settlements and settlers would remain in place.
• Israel permitted to annex 30% of West Bank.
• Palestinian capital would be in Abu Dis, not Jerusalem.
• Some Palestinian Israeli citizens would become citizens of Palestine.
• Israeli control over air space, entry/exit, and the like.
• Israel to determine when Palestinians meet conditions for statehood.
A multi-dimensional approach to peace

- Top down, i.e. core issues
- Inside out, e.g. UAE
- Outside in, e.g. UAE
- Bottom up, e.g. QoL
- CBMs
- Accountability
- P2P