Bruce Blair is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. Before joining Brookings, Dr. Blair was a project director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. He was also a U.S. Air Force officer in the Strategic Air Command and a Minuteman ICBM launch control officer. Dr. Blair is the author of numerous books including The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (1993), and his articles have appeared in The New York Times, Scientific American, and The Washington Post. Dr. Blair received his Ph.D. from Yale University and is considered the world's foremost expert on nuclear missile safety and strategic defense. We would like to thank him for his time.

PAR: There have been many different events over the past year that are important for national security. The first one is the proliferation of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. I was wondering if there are some general reasons that you think India initially proliferated.

Blair: The Southeast Asian proliferation is not a new case in 1998, except in the sense of underground testing of nuclear weapons. The program to proliferate part of their weapons arsenal goes way back in both countries and has been a source of consternation in the U.S. government, to say the least. But my own view is that India moved to the point of actually testing weapons from their arsenals, which, as I say, have long been proliferated, for primarily domestic/political reasons. India is controlled by a party and a government, which is strongly nationalistic and has a certain view of the role of nuclear weapons in the status of India. And this is its entry card into big power status in that view and it also, I think, played, in those terms, very well into the domestic voter. This act of testing in India was just wildly popular among Indian citizens. The testing was ostensibly triggered by the threat of China. At least that’s what India claims; there’s a debate over the degree to which China threatens India and the need for India to have nuclear weapons to counterbalance against Chinese power. Pakistan tested merely because India did and so it just followed suit to establish clearly in India’s mind that Pakistan does have nuclear weapons and has the ability to deter [any] Indian nuclear threat. And so that was just a domino effect. Pakistan’s arsenal goes back to its war with India. Decades ago when Pakistan lost a war with India, its government concluded that it would never go into a war with India that it would lose. [In their view], a nuclear arsenal was its ticket to security in its relations with India. The big shocker was, of course, the actual testing. It was a shocker not because it revealed the existence of arsenals in India and Pakistan (because everyone knew proliferation had already taken place). It was a shocker for many of us in the west—the United States and Europe—who had become complacent about nuclear weapons and felt that the nuclear era was winding down because the Cold War was winding down. It woke us up to the fact that much of the rest of the world may just now be entering the nuclear era. And this was kind of a difficult lesson to observe.

PAR: Some have suggested that Pakistan may have actually shared their nuclear expertise with other Islamic countries creating, in effect, an Islamic bomb. Is the probability of this great, in terms of the technical issues, or can knowledge alone create a viable nuclear weapons program?

Blair: I really don’t know what Pakistan’s intentions are to share its nuclear expertise or materials. But the key missing ingredient in almost all nuclear weapons programs around the world is not expertise, it’s not technology, it’s fizzle materials—plutonium or highly enriched uranium. That’s what really lacking in all these programs, such as in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea. And that’s what they all seem to require because they basically already seem to have figured out how to make a bomb, so now they just need the materials. If Pakistan were to transfer fissionable materials—like plutonium and highly enriched uranium—to any other country, it would be a gross violation of international norms and I think would carry such high costs that it would be extremely ill-advised to even consider. Personally, I doubt whether they would find it in their interests to transfer nuclear materials to another country.

PAR: In order to reduce the chances of an accidental launch of nuclear weapons, should the United States supply India and Pakistan with advice and command and control technologies, such as permission action links or coded switch systems? Are those types of technologies compatible with foreign systems?

Blair: Well, the problem with transferring command and control and early warning technology to India or Pakistan, or any other country, is that it might give them the confidence to move down the path toward deployment of weapons. [This might encourage them to mate] warheads to missiles and aircraft, putting them on high alert and even adopting some of the dangerous practices that the United States and Soviet Union adopted during the Cold War, such as the developing an option for launch on warning, the quick launch of weapons from the seat of sensor information indicating an enemy missile attack. We don’t want to transfer technologies that encourage countries to feel confident that they can now put their forces on an advance state of readiness without fear of losing control. On the other hand, if they do move down that road on their own, unilaterally, putting weapons into hair-trigger configuration that is unsafe, then it tempts one to think about offering them the technologies that would make them safer. I think the best approach for now would be for the United States and Russia and the other declared nuclear powers (Britain, France and China) to set an example to the rest of the world and stand down their nuclear arsenals. [If they] take them off high levels of alert, remove the hair trigger and make them safer, they would create an international norm of safety that applies to all countries, including India and Pakistan, which says that “you should not deploy your weapons in a launch ready configuration.” We, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China, should be trying to create a taboo against deploying weapons on high alert. We should set the example by standing down our forces so that we inhibit any country from crossing that threshold.

PAR: Would any sort of help to any potentially proliferating country be seen by other countries as an endorsement of proliferation? Is that why Congress is enacting policies to look down upon those type activities?

Blair: Well, we have a very black and white policy towards proliferation which is that it’s bad if countries with acquired nuclear weapons should cease and desist, even roll back their programs. And some countries have done that. South Africa for example has voluntarily given up [their weapons] and submitted to international inspections to prove that fact. There have been countries that have rolled back their nuclear programs and have convinced the position of the United State that there should be very thought of and clear powers. There are no shades of gray here in any encouragement whatsoever, in countries other than the original five, to move down the nuclear path. Any step, any encouragement is strongly rejected as a slippery slope because it could lead to greater proliferation of nuclear weapons rather than nonproliferation.

PAR: You’ve written about many different steps that can be taken to reduce the probability of accidental launch of nuclear weapons by either Russia or the United States. These have included the implementation of command and control destruct systems for nuclear missiles and an increased role for nuclear risk reduction centers and decentralized launch decisions. Has Washington been receptive to these suggestions, and can these same suggestions be applied to relationship between to the United States and China or Pakistan?

Blair: Well, most of the steps that I’ve recommended affect the operations of nuclear weapons, as opposed to, say, the size of the strategic arsenals. My recommendations would alter the pattern of current operations, so that for example, we would not be on red alert, ready for immediate launch on a moment’s notice. Today, Russia and the United States each have over 2000 high yield strategic warheads on missiles, land and sea, that are ready to be fired very very quickly—within minutes. It’s my position that however many weapons we have in our arsenals, whether it’s tens of thousands or tens, that those weapons ought to be operated in safer fashion than they have been to date. And that means that we should stand the thin line. We should take steps like those that President Bush ordered in 1991. President Bush ordered the de-alerting of more than 1000 strategic weapons in the U.S. strategic arsenal by taking launch keys away from launch commanders, hiding the missiles so that a launch signal can’t ignite a missile booster to fire, and even taking warheads off missiles. These are steps that I think would make the U.S. and Russia much less susceptible to illicit or accidental or mistaken launch. Hence, most of the steps that I’m talking about dramatically affect the operation of our nuclear forces—their day to day operational practices. And frankly, this is an area that has been off-limits in our history. The military has had almost exclusive control of our pattern of operational ground forces. The civilian leadership of our government sets the size of the budget and sets the size of the arsenal through arms control agreements and legislation. But the civilian government has left operational practices largely to the military. And so, my proposals are not very popular within the U.S. military establishment because they are often seen as intrusions into a very special domain. The military is deeply suspicious of people outside of their narrow circle when we begin to meddle in these operational issues. So it’s been not an easy sell. On the other hand, President Bush ordered steps along the lines in 1991 and they were quickly implemented. But some parts of the military had embraced this order. President Bush picked up the phone and asked strategic command if there’s something we can do to stand down our strategic forces. And the guy at the other end of the phone, General Lee Butler, who has since come out from his retirement years as an abolitionist, said “yes, there are plenty of things we could do,” including, for example, taking weapons off of alert. For some commanders it’s not such a provocative idea. In fact, it makes a whole lot of sense. There’s no one happier about eliminating smaller, tactical nuclear weapons than the surface Navy and the U.S. Army. They don’t consider these weapons very usable because all they do is create onerous requirements to maintain these weapons at a very strict safety and security environment. This is a big, big pain for these units to do.

PAR: During the Cold war, Russia was known to have an incredibly strong and sophisticated system to prevent accidental launch of nuclear weapons. Do you think their model of strict top down control of nuclear weapons will continue to survive if Russia’s economy continues to falter or if their political climate becomes hostile?

Blair: I’ve examined both the U.S. and the Soviet/Russian nuclear agreements about as closely as one can from the outside, and I must say that I have been very impressed with Russian nuclear safeguards. The architecture of safeguards is much more impressive than the U.S. system. For example, they have very strict centralized control of all their nuclear weapons, and very extensive uses of technical safeguards—known as permissive actions links—devices specifically designed to prevent crews from firing weapons without authority. By comparison, it was only 1997 that the United States finally put safeguards on its Triton submarines that would physically prevent a Triton crew from firing its 200 warheads on submarines without authority or permission from authority. So the United States’ history has been decentralized authority and we’ve gradually tightened it up over the years. The Soviet Union and Russia—going all the way back to Stalin—which you could imagine had a very tight system. That’s not surprising because strict top-down control is a core value in Soviet political and military culture. And just think of Stalin—it would have been like this. They insisted on very strict control from top to bottom. But the baseline configuration of the Soviet/Russian system is very messy. And because this very impressive architecture has not been properly maintained, it deteriorated. Physically, organizationally, and in human terms, atmospherically—they don’t have the spare parts to maintain it, the people aren’t being as well trained to maintain it, and their moral has declined. There are also huge problems in the Russian nuclear command and control system. I doubt whether their command system can endure this stress for the indefinite future. I would not be surprised if the suppressive architecture of control broke down, and after what amounts to a failure of nuclear control, results in a serious nuclear incident of some kind. I don’t know what form it might take or when. The failure could involve a break down at the top, some kind of coup alla August 1991, or it could involve an unauthorized action taken by a disgruntled or frustrated lower-level commander or crew launch. Or the failure could involve a false warning because of deterioration in its early warning satellites and ground radar producing false indication of an attack. Or, it could involve some accident that results from just poor maintenance or poor efficiency in handling weapons, resulting from less training. Russian bomber pilots, for example, are flying about 15 hours a year. That’s not enough time to remain efficient—you can barely take off and land a plane safely if you only fly 15 hours a year—that compares to a couple of hundred hours a year for our pilots. So across the board there has been deterioration in the Russian arsenal. This in my mind represents the most serious international nuclear threat.

PAR: There have been actions taken by the U.S. Congress—the Nunn-Lugar Act—to try to help Russia. Do you think the U.S. could and should do more to help out Russia?

Blair: Well, these programs are very much on the right track but they’re not a drop in the bucket—they’re no where close to filling the bucket either—particularly as the need grows because the Russian system is unraveling. So you can’t have a constant level of support to bolster safeguards if your system is [breaking apart] by the day—you need to put more and more effort into it to strengthen that system. On the other hand, it’s just not clear how you leverage it effectively because so much assistance goes down the drain, so inefficiently spent that it’s a source of enormous frustration. We spend what? In the order of half a billion a year for assistance in this area for Russian nuclear forces, for their scientists, and for their atomic facilities—to bolster safety and security and material accounting. It’s only a fraction of what’s needed. We probably should be spending at least two to three times what we are. On the other hand, there are some areas we’re spending money just as we solve the problem. And that’s why I think one of the better solutions is for the United States and Russia to figure out an agreement that would stand down those arsenals. If, for example, a failure in control were to occur, then those missiles couldn’t hurt us. They wouldn’t have any warheads.

PAR: You wrote a chapter in a new book entitled Nuclear Turning Point: Blueprint for Deep Dealing with Nuclear Weapons. What are your latest suggestions for reducing the risks of an inadvertent attack?

Blair: Quite a few recommendations, some of which are more politically palatable, feasible, than others. For example, I recommend the United States and Russia immediately stand down and take off alert the weapons that are slated for elimination under START II, following the precedent set by former President Bush in 1991. In 1991, President Bush ordered weapons slated for elimination under START I, even though that treaty hadn’t even been ratified yet. So that’s not a particularly controversial step even though it has plenty of opposition. But you can line up strong congressional support for a proposal like that. Senators Daschle (D-SD) and Bob Kerrey (D-NE) of Nebraska as well as former Senator Nunn have all endorsed at least the thrust of that proposal. Senator Kerrey gave a speech, you may remember just this last November, to the Council on Foreign Relations in which he advocated we stand down alertness unilaterally [on] all of our weapons in excess of START III levels. We haven’t gotten the Russians to ratify START II yet. Senator Kerrey went on to propose the United States and Russia discuss—seriously discuss—the possibility of taking all our weapons off alert. Senator Daschle has been a champion of this agenda. Senator Bingaman (D-NM) has been a long-standing supporter. So when you line up support like this from people who are generally very cautious people, including Senator Nunn, then you find you’re not that far way from political consensus. But the more radical proposal would be to take off alert all nuclear weapons. It was a proposal I actually made almost ten years ago. People are beginning to accept that the Cold War really is over—to the extent that it doesn’t make sense anymore now to keep so many weapons ready for immediate launch. Deterrence is not a problem. Safety is the problem. And as that sinks in the minds of officials and others in Washington D.C., they make that mental transition from a concern for a cold-blooded Russian attack to a concern for mistaken or accidental or unauthorized Russian launch, then these proposals begin to attract more weight or political support. I think I’m on the right side of this issue.

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