Amy Smithson is a Senior Associate at The Henry L. Stimson Center, where she directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project. She launched the program in 1993 to serve as an information clearinghouse, watchdog, and problem-solver regarding chemical and biological weapons issues. She has published widely in journals, testified before Congress, and is frequently consulted by the news media, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, CNN, NBC Nightly News and U.S. News & World Report. She also co-edited Open Skies, Arms Control, and Cooperative Security (1992). Dr. Smithson holds degrees from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Georgetown University and George Washington University. Our discussion with Dr. Smithson centered around the international and domestic implications of the spread of chemical and biological weapons. We would like to thank her for her time and her candid answers to our questions.

PAR: First, I wanted to ask you a question about the recent events that are occurring in Iraq. Do you think that the Clinton administration will be successful in eliminating Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capability by force?

Smithson: It’s very, very difficult to locate a lot of the materials that are apparently still unaccounted for from the UN Special Commission Inspection team. In other words, bombing attacks are probably not going to get us there 100% of the way. That is the reason that it’s so important that inspectors are there, on the spot, to confirm things in Iraq, to confirm the destruction of chemical and biological agents ignition and specialized equipment. Having said that, given the type of menace Saddam Hussein is, given how long and ardently he has given the world the finger, anything that can be done to contain this man, including damage to his generic, conventional military capabilities, is probably not such a bad idea.

PAR: Given the ease of which these chemical weapons components that you referred to can be obtained, due to their dual use nature, and also because of the portability of the technology itself, how realistic is it to assume that an intrusive certification measure that we’ve used in Iraq can be effective at preventing countries other than Iraq from starting this type of chemical weapons program?

Smithson: Okay, now, let’s take it issue for issue. The chemicals and reactors that are needed to make chemical agents are available from tens of thousands of commercial companies around the world. What I’m going to take issue with is the use of their term ‘portability.’ Yes, it’s possible to take apart a chemical production line, and move it from place to place. But, reassembling that plant is not something that can be done without some notice. And if [Saddam Hussein] is trying to produce large quantities of agents of the type that would be needed to actually execute a battle, the equipment for that type of a production line isn’t something one just packs up in a suitcase overnight and totes away. It’s a big site and once one has used that equipment, the pipes, the reactors, to make a chemical agent of the strength of something line VX or Sarin or Tabin or some anti-nerve agent, then you’re just not going to break it down and pack it up. It has to be truly, truly decontaminated. It’s a complicated thing. The biological agents stay in cultures. The key pieces of equipment are munitions that would be used for weapons invasions. The inspectors have been able to locate and destroy some of the dual use equipment about the chemical and biological units. This is equipment that probably shouldn’t have the label “dual-use” attached to it, because there are no other purposes for it, other than designated military activity. But there are lots of items of equipment that the inspectors did locate and tag. They have been monitoring for the past few years on a periodic basis to be sure that they aren’t being used for military purposes. And right now, all bets are off as to where the stuff is because the inspectors have not been there for quite some time. So, indeed [Saddam] could have taken the pieces of the puzzles that he had scattered across the contrary and by this time, reassembled a chemical or a biological facility.

PAR: You have also written extensively about the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). There have been efforts made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to put pressure on North Korea to join the CWC. Would a North Korea endorsement send some kind of signal to other nations who are reluctant to join the convention?

Smithson: There are a handful of countries that are typically referred to by pundits as pariah states: North Korea, Syria, Lybia, Iraq are the ones that quickly come to mind. These countries usually don’t join anything. In the case of Iraq, Iraq was a member of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, flagrantly violating both of these accords. Ditto for Russia, by the way, particularly with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. There have been a number of questions raised as to whether Russia gave nuclear weapons assistance to other state perhaps, namely Iraq and Iran in furthering their nuclear programs and therefore not maybe abiding by its agreements. Having said that, let’s go back around at North Korea. I’m not going to place any money on a bet that North Korea will join the Chemical Weapons Convention any time soon simply because the motivation for North Korea it seems to me to be first and foremost its interaction with the United States. I’m not sure that that’s the surest route for North Korea to get the level of quality of interaction that it wants to keep as a government. Having said that, I’d be the first one to stand up and cheer if North Korea joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and if they are one of those that lead to the banning of these weapons. South Korea has joined the treaty, and has already declared that their chemical weapons capability has been extinct.

PAR: Also regarding the CWC, I came across an editorial that you wrote over a year ago for the Bullet in and the Atomic Scientist where you noted that after Non-Proliferation legislation was approved by the U.S. Senate you noted the key provisions were excluded from the treaty. I was wondering if any further progress has been made in trying to put those provisions back into the CWC. And if not, how do these hurt the treaty, and is the convention is still effective?

Smithson: I think you got a couple of things garbled there. Let’s run through the chain here. The treaty itself, in my mind, is one of the most complete and ambitious arms control accords ever before negotiated. It may very well be the high-watermark for arms control and monitoring activities. That’s because it contains not just routine inspections but also a challenge inspection capability that is very robust. It is precedent setting because it will apply to all countries that join the accord. With regard to the U.S. implementing this legislation, Congress put into this legislation a few measures that will have a very damaging effect, gutting effects, on the Chemical Weapons Commission. There are three but two are easy to capsulate. One is a provision that will allow the President of the United States to refuse a request for challenge inspections on the grounds that it will threaten national security. That’s in direct confrontation to the obligation we undertook when we ratified the accord. There are very clear statements and obligations in the treaty that any country that joins must accept a challenge inspection at any time, at any place, on its territories. No “ifs,” no “ands,” no “buts.” When Congress sets out for the President an exemption, what it does is open up a loophole for other countries to follow. The second exemption, one that [was] actually created when the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratify the treaty on the 24th of April, 1997, involves the disposition of samples taken during the inspection. It’s going to be very rare that a sample is taken to begin with. An inspection tool of last resort—it’s a very strong inspection tool—it’s not like going in there to review a facilities records, and interview its personnel. It’s basically saying: “we, the inspectors, think you’re cheatin’. We’re going to take a sample which will confirm for us whether or not there are chemicals present, or whether or not there are residues of a chemical agent precursor here that might indicate that you have indeed made or used a chemical weapon.” The inspectors will carry with them equipment to analyze these samples. But the equipment is, at present, unable to function properly, and in many cases, unable to give the inspectors a definitive answer as to what that sample contains. And so, the treaty provides for those samples to be sent to laboratories in other countries that are designated by the inspectorate to conduct further analysis and determine with great certainty just exactly what the sample contains. The U.S. exemption, written by Congress, approved by the Clinton administration, is that those samples would not be allowed to leave the U.S. Hey! I’m no rocket scientist, but it don’t take me too long to figure out that if no sample leaves the United States, that if the United States can refuse a challenge inspection, the minute we want to challenge Beijing, Tehran, Moscow, they say: “hmm…sorry ‘bout that! No, no, no! National Security! You’re not coming here!” Or, if a sample is taken during an inspection and the on-sight analysis is incomplete, then there’s no way the sample is leaving the territories of other countries. What we’ve done is shot ourselves in the foot. It’s both the Senate and the Clinton administration that agreed to this. These are things that the U.S. delegation that negotiated this treaty to the Reagan and bush administrations, fought very hard to get put into the treaty, in terms of the ability to take samples and send them to laboratories for further analysis. They were U.S. ideas. And we’re gutting the treaty.

PAR: Have there been any objections by other countries once the legislation was passed?

Smithson: There have been objections of different intensity in the world of diplomacy in international affairs. The first level of shaking one’s finger at another government is something called a “demarche”—there have been “demarches.” “Demarches” also occur at different levels. One can go under the name of secretary of State or under the name of a president. There can be calls from president to president. There can be concerted international public statement. So there are different levels of pressure. My expectation is that at some point some government, maybe Australia, maybe Canada, maybe the British, will actually pursue the American challenge inspection exemption through the international court system. It is a blatant contradiction to the articles of the treaty.

PAR: You alluded to Russia’s current inability to control chemical weapons. Given that Russia, has the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world, what can the United States do to halt the transfer of chemical weapons to non-state actors or rogue nations?

Smithson: In 1995, I did a study on the security around Russia’s nuclear weapons storage facilities—there are seven of them. The location of five is now a matter of public record. I did this study in the aftermath of the Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo where the nerve agent Sarin was used on subway commuter trains on, I believe, March 20, 1995. At that time, the prevailing wisdom was that if terrorists ever used a weapon of mass destruction, it would be nuclear. They would go for the biggest gun of all. Well, I think it’s something of a misnomer that nuclear is the biggest of all when one thinks about the possibility of germ warfare. Having said that, I decided to look into the security issue and the study which was released in the fall of 1995 and resulted in congressional testimony. My conclusion was that you needed either a crowbar or a physical attack to get into these locations. The security around Russian chemical sites is far worse than security around their nuclear sites. The systems of accountability are structurally non-existent. Soliders take inventory with a pencil and a sheet of paper—these records can be readily changed. One person can carry some of these weapons—the smaller rounds weigh about 100 pounds. Some of the storage sites don’t have clear zones, or lighting or intensive levels of fencing like you’d find even around the most basic conventional U.S. military sites. The real interests to these facilities are secured by a gate with a single padlock. The munitions are stored in structures made out of concrete blocks that have glass windows and some of them have thatched roofs. There are no electronic security devices, or physical barriers worth mentioning, other than a scrawny fence. Many soldiers I witnessed hadn’t been fed, hadn’t been paid for quite a while…in a couple of cases, the soldiers were actually growing their own food at the storage sites. So, that’s what I told Congress, a crowbar or a fistful of dollars. It’s a serious problem, and certain deficit reduction programs have been wonderful things in that they have put a lot of effort into helping former Soviet states secure and dismantle their nuclear arsenals. All of the nuclear weapons are out of the Ukraine, Belarus, and Khzakstan. That’s a tremendous accomplishment. There are literally thousands of nuclear munitions that have been disarmed: nuclear silos and submarine launch tubes have been filled and bombers have been destroyed. These are truly wonderful accomplishments. Senators Nunn (former; D-GA) and Lugar (R-IN) and Domenici (R-NM) should be applauded for that. The program needs to expand with additional emphasis into security and dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear and biological weapons complexes which are HUGE. And I’m truly concerned about the possibilities for brain drain particularly on biological weapons complexes. The problems are on such a scale that is very intimidating when one considers the possibilities. The possibilities are so incredible. And the Chemical Weapons Commission has a role to play in this too. There are inspectors that have gone to numerous sites in Russia that have been to all the storage sites; they’re going to the places they should go under the treaty. But that’s not a vehicle necessary to fund the destruction or the enhanced security of these facilities. The treaty is there to be a requirement Russia must live up to.

PAR: So, it’s not just a problem of funding for Russia but also one of cooperation.

Smithson: Correct.

PAR: And insuring its governmental systems are in check. Smithson: It’s also a question of whether or not elected officials truly understand the circumstances in Russia and can they look past the old Soviet layer and all the difficulties that came with the Cold War. They need to appreciate the gravity of the security threat that is encompassed in the chemical and biological weapons complexes that still remain in Russia. These weapons need to be destroyed.

PAR: Finally, a former CIA director recently noted that the United State is not prepared for a catastrophic terrorist attack. He advocated for the formation of a so-called National Terrorist Center to coordinate efforts on the state and federal level in the event of such an attack. Could you comment on his proposal, and give your own assessment of the overall readiness of the United States?

Smithson: Well, it’s kind of difficult to know when and where such an attack might have taken place. But if one is watching closely, what is happening across this country, whether it be the anthrax hoaxes or Larry Wayne Harris’s who get their hands on the plague, there is a steadily increasing tempo of incidents. This indicates that individuals and groups of various sorts are trying to get their hands on biological materials. Again, let’s give credit where it’s due. Senators Nunn, Lugar and also Domenici have sponsored legislation to get technical and financial assistance right where it needs to be—to the first responders: the firemen, the police, the emergency medical services, that will be first on the scene when the city acts. They need an awareness of the threat, they need training and equipment to better prepare then to cope with and mitigate the consequences of having a chemical agent released in a subway, building, or sporting arena in City X. Okay? That’s exactly what the Domestic Preparedness Program would be. This is a long-term effort—cities aren’t going to be prepared, they need practice with the equipment to understand the special precautions they would take. They are better equipped with protective gear, detectors, medical antidotes, and the life to deal with this. There’s no such thing as “perfectly prepared.” Let’s just hope that the would-be terrorists in the United States are stupid, that they choose to strike a city where domestic preparedness training has already taken place, and those first responders are out there drilling and ready to deal with this. It’s not going to be easy.

Edited by Mark Paustenbach and Dan O'Conner

Back Home

All content © The Colby Reader, c/o Student Activities, 5900 Mayflower Hill, Waterville, ME 04901,207-872-3847,politics@colby.edu