by James J. Marquardt
Visiting Assistant Professor
Department of Government
Colby College

As a rule in American presidential politics, the candidates do not give much attention to foreign policy. It was the campaign team of Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton who, in the 1992 presidential election, coined the now infamous phrase, "It’s the economy, stupid!" Clinton skillfully used a clear liability - namely, his lack of foreign policy experience - against his opponent, tapping into the electorate’s resentment of President Bush’s clear preference for matters of state at a time when serious economic and social problems mounted at home. To the extent that Clinton did address foreign policy, he made a point of relating it to domestic policy. For instance, trade liberalization mattered because Clinton believed that it would contribute to economic growth and prosperity at home.

Moreover, presidential candidates rarely articulate a clear vision of America’s role in the world. What are America’s core interests? What are the principle threats to those interests? Under what conditions should America use military force to defend them? As a candidate and later as president, Bill Clinton struggled to define his grand strategy. His lack of experience and interest in foreign policy indeed hampered his efforts at statesmanship. Yet he is not primarily to blame for his administration’s early foreign policy failures. After all, the Bush administration also had its fair share of these failures. As a former CIA director and envoy to Communist China, Bush liked to think of himself as his best foreign policy advisor and the foreign policy president. Yet his administration was remarkably slow to react to the revolutionary events taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and Iraq’s bullying of its Persian Gulf neighbors.

The current turbulence in American foreign policy that emerged in the early 1990’s and that is likely to persist for the foreseeable future says much more about fundamental changes in the world over the last decade or so than it does about poor presidential leadership. From 1948 to 1992, the concentration of world power in the United States and the Soviet Union, together with the intense ideological divide separating the two countries, gave rise to an American strategy for the containment of Soviet power and influence the world over. Containment had its critics, and even some of its proponents disagreed at times about how it should be implemented and where in the world it should apply. Containment also gave rise to serious misperceptions, such as the tendency on the part of American statesmen to view Communism as a Soviet-led monolithic force, that produced bad foreign policies (e.g., the escalation of the war in Vietnam and America’s support for right-wing dictatorships the world over). Yet, overall, the grand strategy of containment made foreign policy "easy." This is no longer the case, however. Containment may have helped to end the Cold War, but the Cold War certainly put an end to containment.

This essay considers alternative strategies for America after the Cold War. It also surveys the foreign policy positions of the major candidates in this year’s election in order to discern the likely grand strategy of the next president of the United States.

Over the past decade, American statesmen have sought to identify a new, "true North" of American statecraft to replace containment. Four model strategies have emerged. Two are committed to a leading role for the United States in world affairs - cooperative security and primacy. A third, selective engagement, is less ambitious in its vision of America’s role in the world. It focuses America’s internationalism on regions of major power concentrations. Neo-isolationism, a fourth strategy, all but ends a leading role for America in world affairs.

The strategy of cooperative security envisions a world in which the United States’ commitment to peace is manifested through American leadership of international institutions. Cooperative security rejects the earlier notion of collective security in which states assume legal obligations to come to each other’s defense in the event that one or several of them are attacked (e.g., League of Nations). It relies instead on global and regional institutions acting as vehicles to coordinate military action. Cooperative security is deeply committed to arms control, confidence-building, and transparency (i.e., the sharing of information) as mechanisms to avoid international conflict. This strategy also recognizes the utility of military power for peacekeeping and relief operations and for dealing with new threats like weapons proliferation and terrorism. Although military power serves defensive purposes only, cooperative security say that some states, namely states like the United States with major global commitments, require considerable military power and the ability to project that power long distances. Cooperative security’s understanding that peace is indivisible leads it to stresses multilateral over unilateral action.

Critics point out several basic problems with this strategy. First, cooperative security downplays the importance of the national interest in shaping the policy preferences of states. In fact, cooperative security’s critics on the right argue that its proponents wrongly see multilateralism as an end in and of itself rather than simply a means to an end - that is, the promotion of the national interest. Second, cooperative security underestimates the extent to which coordinated action (e.g., United Nations peacekeeping and NATO intervention) is possible even when states share basic goals. The inability of states to "get their act together" may reward aggression. Third, collective security’s commitment to arms control as a way to keep the peace cannot prevent the rise of potential aggressors. Moreover, if other states act in ways that are contrary to the goals shared by the majority of the international community, collective security says that status quo states need to be ready, willing, and able to use force against them. In situations like this, some states may "buckpass" - that is, balk at the use of force and hope that others assume the costs of defending the status quo.

The foreign policy of the Clinton administration (1993 to date) has been largely guided by cooperative security. In 1996, President Clinton’s national security team produced a detailed vision of American grand strategy called "The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." This document’s endorsement of a multilateral approach to security is predicated on the notion that, as a result of the rise of security threats that are transnational in scope, states are finding it increasingly difficult and impractical to seek national solutions to their security problems. This strategy has three components: (1) a strong national defense and effective diplomacy that are geared towards cooperative security measures, such as NATO expansion and a strengthened United Nations; (2) the opening of foreign markets and economic growth worldwide; and (3) the promotion of democracy. This strategy embraces a liberal view of international relations, one that recognizes American political leadership, global prosperity, and states with representative democracies as the essential pillars of world peace and security.

The strategy of primacy essentially says that a preponderance of American power is the best way to achieve peace after the Cold War. Such an imbalance of power in America’s favor (relative to all other great powers) will have two basic effects. First, it will reassure our allies and coalition partners that we will stand by them in time of need. Second, it will signal to potential aggressors—both at the regional and global levels—that moves against the United States and its many interests abroad can only come at very high cost to them. The hope is that American power will act as a strong deterrent against aggression and, if need be, soundly defeat aggression should deterrence fail. This internationalist grand strategy sees America as a "benign hegemon" or a non-threatening global leader whose unique and preeminent position in world affairs can persist for years, if not decades, so long as America’s actions help maintain a world order that is generally agreeable to other great powers.

Proponents of primacy are committed to policies like NATO expansion and a continued American role in international organizations so long as institutions do not stray far from American core interests, such as maintaining American preeminence. Primacy pays much attention to identifying potential threats to American interests and measures to contain them. A rising China and a resurgent Russia top the list of potential challengers to American preeminence. Primacy advocates are also concerned with non-traditional military threats from non-state actors such as terrorist organizations with weapons of mass destruction. Also, fear that a rogue state like North Korea may try to strike the American homeland is the rationale behind primacy’s call for the continued strong support for the development and eventual deployment of ballistic missile defense. Meeting all potential threats to America’s preeminence will not be cheap, but the real challenge for primacy proponents is America’s political will to lead rather than the costs of that leadership.

Primacy has its shortcomings. For instance, America’s muscle flexing and paternalism is more likely to upset its allies than reassure them. The French government has expressed concern about elements of primacy in American foreign policy in the 1990’s. One of the main reasons why it favors a stronger Europe, including the formation of a European army, is the fear that the United States will use its unique position in the world to keep Europe under its wing. (France has also expressed the opposite fear that, in the event of an American retreat into isolationism, Europe will be unprepared to provide for its own security needs.) Also, some critics argue that a muscle bound America simply increases the likelihood that statesmen will seek out crisis areas where the United States can push its weight around. A corollary argument says that, as a result of its high level of international involvement, America will find it increasingly difficult to stay on top: as much as America might try to prevent it, other states will balance against us in order to contain our power and influence.

Primacy best captures the Bush administration’s foreign policy (1989-92). The development, maintenance, and, if required, the exercise of American power occupied the center of the administration’s vision of a "new world order." National security planning documents argued that the United States should harness its formidable military power to establish a post-Cold War "Pax Americana." This power would reassure America’s allies that their security was in America’s national interest and serve as a clear rationale against their enhancing their own defenses, which they might one day use to challenge U.S. global leadership. For instance, President Bush supported the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU) but looked askance at European efforts to develop an integrated military force that could act outside NATO channels and hence American stewardship. To America’s foes, primacy under Bush made it plain that the United States stood ready to defend the new world order against rogue states, states with aspirations for regional hegemony, and a resurgent Russia. In short, precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor stood as the central objective of the Bush administration’s foreign policy.

Cooperative security and primacy share a commitment to maintaining an open world economy and supporting democratization and humanitarianism abroad. They differ on a few key points, however. First, whereas collective security favors multilateral mechanisms to achieve these goals, primacy puts unilateral action above coordinated action. Second, primacy is less committed to humanitarian intervention than cooperative security, especially when the use of force in this way compromises American power and does not have a clear "exit strategy." Because they envision new roles and missions for American power, both strategies also call for increases in defense spending. But here, too, there is an important difference. Cooperative security seeks modest increases in spending. America’s global military engagements are likely to increase, but their costs will be off-set as a result of collaboration with other like-minded states. Primacy calls for major increases in defense spending, since America’s post-Cold War engagements in world affairs will be numerous, are likely to require the unilateral use of force, and should be carried out with overwhelming power and superior technology so that political goals are achieved at minimal cost.

A third alternative grand strategy for the United States after the Cold War is selective engagement. This strategy holds that America has a vital role to play in international politics but that the extent to which this country engages itself abroad should be largely determined by balance of power politics. That is to say, America’s security ties abroad should be limited to major regions of the globe where there are imbalances of power. By allying with the weaker of two adversaries or opposing coalitions, the United States can help prevent the rise of a hegemonic state that might dominate a region of strategic importance to the United States and thereby threaten American interests. This balancing behavior focuses on regions where there are major concentrations of world power, such as Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. As a practical matter, then, proponents of selective engagement say that America should significantly reduce its worldwide military commitments. Many say that America should withdraw its remaining 100,000 or so forces from Europe. Such a move would, for all intents and purposes, spell the end of NATO. Only in the event of a resurgent Russia, as well as a growing Germany (the consensus among students of balance of power politics is that European unification will ultimately fail), should the United States return to Europe. Also, a rising China may require America to maintain and possibly increase its military commitments in East Asia.

Selective engagement rejects primacy’s notion that peace requires a preponderance of American power. To the contrary, it says that the concentration of power in the hands of the United States is bound to give rise to measures by other states to contain America’s influence in the world. Examples of ad-hoc political coalitions to contain America are already evident. As noted above, France’s commitment to a European army is in part motivated by its fear that, for Europe to emerge as a global power, it needs the military capabilities that will allow Europe to act independent of the United States, especially in its own backyard (e.g., the Balkans). Former President Boris Yeltsin of Russia sought closer ties between his country and China as a counterweight to the United States. France, Russia, and China have formed a working anti-American coalition in the United Nations Security Council and recently succeeded in blocking America’s attempt to reintroduce the same international inspection system in Iraq that was in place prior to Saddam Hussein’s decision to expel U.N. weapons inspectors several years ago. Selective engagement holds a pessimistic view of international institutions.

Few scholars or policy practitioners consider neo-isolationism a viable grand strategy. Neo-isolationism is criticized for its particularly narrow understanding of the national interest as the physical security of the United States. In addition, in the absence of some degree of engagement in international politics, critics suggests that America may very well face potentially grave threats to its physical security, the very outcome neo-isolationism says it will prevent. Second, once institutionalized, neo-isolationism will be difficult to change in the event that circumstances abroad call for American engagement. Third, there is no guarantee that reducing defense spending will either result in new domestic spending or, regardless of where resources are allocated, improve the quality of everyday life in America.

No single model of American grand strategy today is likely to produce the parsimony and clarity of containment. Moreover, who ever is the next president of the United States and regardless of the grand strategy the winning candidate adopts, America will have to get used to greater confusion in foreign policy making. Yet it is very much worth exploring the grand strategy that will likely inform the foreign policy of the next president of the United States. Who will garner each party’s nomination is no longer in doubt: for the Democrats it is Vice President Al Gore, and for the Republicans it is Texas Governor George W. Bush. The foreign policy positions of their unsuccessful challengers —on the Democratic side, former Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey, and Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona—also deserve mention, because they help illustrate two basic truisms about post-Cold War American grand strategy. First, the next president will be a committed internationalist, regardless of his party affiliation. Second, the "liberal-conservative" divide in American politics will have some impact on the next president’s foreign policy. Gore and especially Bradley are influenced by cooperative security. They stress the importance of U.S. leadership in the search for multilateral solutions to global problems. Bush and McCain are straight-away primacy advocates. They rely on American unilateralism as the primary vehicle to promote global peace and prosperity.

Unlike the other major candidates, Vice President Al Gore is in a special position when it comes to foreign policy. On the one hand, he has had the least difficulty of the four in convincing the general public about his readiness to serve as America’s chief statesman. On the other hand, he faces a unique challenge in that he wants credit for the successes of American foreign policy under his boss and wants distance himself politically from Clinton on issues where the president has been subject to toughest criticism.

Gore’s vision of America’s role in the world is generally consistent with the grand strategy of collective security. With Gore as president, the American foreign policy will take a similar path as it did under Clinton. Gore’s vision of American grand strategy puts the interests of the United States first and foremost. America will remain the undisputed military power in the world by improving its military strength and preparedness. The real but modest increases in defense spending started by Clinton several years ago (after major real reductions in spending in the early and mid-1990’s by Presidents Bush and Clinton), will continue into the foreseeable future.

Yet, for Gore, as for Clinton, the national interests of the United States may coincide with interests of others. In this context, American policy is committed to working with America’s allies to find multilateral solutions to the problems they share. Multilateralism matters because, by embedding American power in international institutions, the United States can advance its national interests and reassure others that it is a reliable ally. This is important because America’s diplomatic influence will diminish should the United States stray from its commitment to international institutions. Moreover, other states may take matters into their own hands, which might mean competition and instability among the great powers and greater assertiveness on the part of states, like Iraq, whose actions may be calculated to take advantage of great power cleavages.

Gore, like Clinton, believes that the fate of Europe and America are one in the same and that, as a result, the United States must continue its role as a European power and help build a new security architecture there. One of the greatest threats to the West’s shared interest in a peaceful Europe is hyper-nationalism and ethnic conflict. NATO’s ground war in Kosovo symbolized the alliance’s commitment to several basic goals: (1) deterring aggression (and punish aggression should deterrence fail); (2) reducing the risk that local wars between ethnic groups do not widen and destablize Europe; and (3) establishing new standards of state conduct, especially with regard to the treatment of ethnic minorities.

Gore has long sought to "build down" strategic arsenals between the United States and Russia, by moving away from potentially destabilizing multi-warhead missiles toward a new generation of many fewer single warhead missiles. To this end, he endorses Russia’s ratification of a strategic arms reduction treaty signed by both sides in the early-1990’s and the immediate negotiation of another agreement that would reduce arsenals to about 2,000 on each side. Gore also supports continued United States assistance to the former Soviet Union, especially to prevent proliferation. He opposed the United States Senate’s decision to vote down a treaty that would have established a permanent ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Gore has moved toward embracing some type of ballistic missile defense, largely because he fears that by not doing so he will appear weak on defense, which could be a serious liability in the general election.

A Gore administration will also seek to continue the Clinton administration’s policies on the world economy. Gore is a strong supporter of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as the controversial World Trade Organization (WTO) and China’s membership in it. Gore has long spoken out in favor of a new partnership between environmentalists and industry to strengthen NAFTA and expand WTO trade rules to include environmental protection and labor standards. Finally, Gore will continue the Clinton administration’s support for democracy and human rights worldwide but, like Clinton, these two goals should not compromise maintaining good relations with great powers like China.

Bradley’s grand strategy is multilateral; it considers international institutions as important vehicles to achieve America’s vital interests. Moreover, unlike the other candidates, Bradley is mindful of the limits of American power and stresses the importance of non-military vehicles to achieving America’s goals abroad.

Key to promoting America’s security interests is the strengthening of existing military alliances, such as NATO. The United States should also increase its reliance on the United Nations to promote peace and security worldwide, such as international peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy, and pay the approximately $1 billion it owes in dues to the organization. Bradley argues that America does not have strategic interests in the Balkans and should not have deployed forces in Bosnia, but he supports NATO action in Kosovo on humanitarian grounds. He also opposed military action against Iraq in 1991, arguing in favor of diplomacy with the option of using force at some later time. Yet, along with the political reinvigoration of NATO, Bradley also calls for the shifting of the burden of defense to America’s allies. Bradley is also a strong supporter of arms control. He supports a ban on anti-personnel mines and opposes the deployment of a full-fledged missile system to defend American cities against ballistic missile attack. Bradley is the only major presidential candidate that does not support increased defense spending.

Bradley is committed to an open world economy. He supports the lowering of trade barriers worldwide and sees the WTO as an instrument of worldwide economic growth and development. Bradley advocates the creation of an earnings insurance program to help workers who lose their jobs or take lower paying jobs as a result of trade liberalization. He also wants greater flexibility regarding health care and pensions so that workers who switch jobs can take their existing benefits with them. Bradley also wants greater publicity or openness of WTO proceedings, welcomes China’s entry into the WTO, seeks to strengthen existing international rules on workers’ rights, and improve the environmental protocols of NAFTA. Finally, Bradley says that, because democracy is a core American value, the United States has a keen interest in promoting democracy and respect for human rights abroad.

George W. Bush’s foreign policy statements are informed by the grand strategy of primacy. His internationalism includes an open world economy and democracy, but it is generally unmoved by environmental and labor concerns.

Bush outlined the essential features of his grand strategy at the Reagan Presidential Library in November of last year, soon after the candidate received bad press for failing a pop-quiz on world leaders given to him by a meddlesome reporter. Of foremost importance to the conduct of American foreign policy, according to Bush, is the restoration of American military power and the morale of those who serve in the military. This requires an increase in defense spending. New spending includes approximately $20 billion over a four year period alone on new weapons systems that leap-frog the emerging generation of technology. A thorough review of U.S. military force structure, strategy, and procurement is also in order. A George W. Bush administration would have as its stated goal the creation of what the candidate calls a "military of the future" in which land, naval, and air forces are "lethal, agile, [and] easier to deploy" than currently. Additional funds would be required to provide better pay and financial incentives for servicemen and women. The motive behind major increase in defense spending is a global military preeminence that deters aggressors and responds to attacks on the United States and its interests abroad with devastating force.

Supplanting military preeminence as a goal of foreign policy (as well as means to conduct foreign policy) is what Bush calls "tough realism" in America’s dealings with a resurgent Russia and a rising China. Governor Bush is committed to ballistic missile defense. The deployment of a defensive shield should go forward regardless of Russia’s objections. On China, Bush also takes a tough line. The United States, he says, will cooperate with China when it can, such as policies to prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea, and compete with China when it must. Although he has declared that the United States has no ill-will toward China, Bush says that the United States has reason to be wary of China’s intentions, especially with regard to Taiwan. The United States also has reason to be concerned with China’s build-up of intercontinental ballistic missiles that can accurately strike targets on the United States mainland and naval power. "China is a competitor, not a strategic partner," he said in his Reagan Library speech, and "China should have no illusions about America’s power and purpose."

Governor Bush’s emphasis on building American military power has little place for multilateral solutions to security problems. Indeed, candidate Bush is critical of the United Nations for involving the United States in costly interventions throughout the world. A new Bush administration would reevaluate America’s military deployments abroad. The presumption is that the United States is likely to end some of its involvement in multilateral troop deployments. Overwhelming American power should be deployed only in those areas of the world where the United States has core national interests at stake. As such, a certain element of selective engagement is also evident in Bush’s foreign policy pronouncements.

Moreover, Bush’s primacy makes room for open global markets and democracy. On trade, Bush wants to further lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, strictly enforce international trade agreements, expand NAFTA throughout the Americas, and allow China and its rival Taiwan to enter the WTO. Restrictions to trade are limited to the tightening of export controls on "dual use" technologies – that is, commercial technologies that could be used for military purposes. Bush opposes the Kyoto agreement on greenhouse gases for two reasons. First, like other conservatives (especially those with ties to the oil industry), Bush challenges the science of climate change. Second, even if climate change is liked to greenhouse gases, Bush says that America should not move to reduce its gas emissions until major developing countries, like India and China, are also required to limit their emissions.

Grand strategy for McCain also has primacy written all over it. For McCain, there are five principles of American diplomacy. First, global leadership is necessary for the defense of American interests. McCain argues that there is, in his words, "no substitute for American leadership" in the world. The United Nations is criticized because McCain believes that this organization runs the risk of getting the United States involved intractable conflicts in regions where America’s interests are not at stake. American leadership, McCain adds, serves more than the national interest of the United States. "[Our] primacy in world affairs is for humanity’s benefit," he said in a 1999 speech. America, in short, is the world’s "indisputable nation." The United States will act, unilaterally if need be, when these interests are threatened. Foremost among potential threats is ballistic missile attack against the American homeland. Therefore, America should move toward the early deployment of ballistic missile defense, even though this move might make Russia insecure.

Second, American interests and values are closely interconnected. Interests shape values, and values shape interests. The issues on which they converge, such as individual freedom and human rights, democracy, pluralism, free markets, and support for the rule of law, will inform America’s strategic vision of its special role in the world and form the basis for the prioritization of America’s foreign policy goals.

Third, diplomacy should be the principal—and always the first—means to address foreign threats to America’s security, but the United States must be prepared to use force in the event that diplomacy fails. McCain says that the United States should build coalitions with like-minded states, but coalition-building is meant to promote American interests— it should not be an end in and of itself. America engagement of China is designed to help maintain stability in East Asia. But good relations with China should not come at the expense of America’s commitment to protecting Taiwan and seeking greater political liberalization within China, such as basic human rights and religious freedoms. The United States should also encourage continued European integration, but a more united Europe cannot come at the expense of NATO. NATO should remain the most important security organization in Europe, and the United States must remain the leading state in NATO. America’s European allies must shoulder more of the burden of providing for their own security, however.

Fourth, credibility is essential in America’s foreign relations. American adversaries must believe that America means what it says, and America should respond to the failure of its enemies to heed its warning with certain punishment.

In a McCain presidency, defense spending will see modest increases. McCain says that some investments are long over due, such as pay and housing and the preparedness of American servicemen and women. New investments are also required in military hardware so that the United States is able to quickly deploy forces worldwide and meet a variety of security threats. McCain would cut spending on expensive and obsolete weapons systems.

McCain is also committed to continued economic openness worldwide and sees globalization as contributing to the continued prosperity in the United States. A McCain presidency would be particularly inclined to use Amercia’s economic power as a tool of foreign policy. So, for instance, the United States would deal with a resurgent and assertive China by threatening to oppose that country’s entry into the WTO. While McCain also favors multilateral measures to protect the global environment, his position on climate change is essentially identical to Governor Bush’s position.

While the future of American foreign policy will not be radically different than it has been in the 1990’s under Presidents Bush and Clinton, the different policy prescriptions found in the contending internationalist grand strategies should not be underestimated. Indeed, they may mean the difference between war and peace, arms racing and arms control, and open economies and trade wars in the years to come.