Leonardo Costa

Wheat or Opium? Choosing a Legal or Illegal Crop under a Harsh Climate

Wheat and Opium (poppy) production are the center of the Afghani economic life. Wheat, the main legal staple, is grown on sixty-eight percent of the cultivated area in the country (World Bank, 2005). Although wheat dominates Afghanistan’s legal economy, the illegal economy in the country is equally important. Afghanistan is the world’s largest grower of Opium Poppy, the input for heroin, supplying the world, in 2002, with 450 tons of heroin (World Bank, 2005). The illegal production of opium poppy generates 2.3 billion dollars a year for Afghanistan, which represents more than fifty percent of the country’s legal GDP (IRIN, 2004). This is roughly equal to the overall legal agriculture (dominated by wheat production) contribution to the economy that corresponds to fifty-three percent of GDP (World Bank, 2005). The equal share in the economy between the illegal and legal sector indicates that Afghani farmers can decide between these two crops to generate their livelihood, wheat and opium poppy. Farmers’ choice is conditioned by the country’s climate, its infrastructure, their economic constraints and governmental policy.

The plants adaptability to Afghan’s harsh and unpredictable climate is fundamental in farmers’ decision-making. Opium poppy flourishes best in dry and warm climate and Afghanistan, according to National Climate Data Center (NCDC, 2007), has a hot and dry summer, which makes it an ideal place to grow this plant, since it can flourish in every province in the country (Kamminga). Unlike opium poppy, wheat can only grow in 14% of the country’s territory, mostly in the north, northeast, and west regions of the country (World Bank 2005). Opium poppy’s adaptability to Afghanistan is a key factor for farmers to make their crop decision.

Opium poppy flourishing Source: IRIN, 2004

The resistance of a plant to frequent droughts, common in Afghanistan (NCDC, 2007), can play a significant role in the crop decision. Wheat production in 2003 increased sixty-two percent, from 1.6 million tons in 2002 to 4.36 million tons in 2003 when the drought that affected the 2002 production was replaced by normal rainfall (Chabot and Dorosh, 2007). This indicates that wheat production in the country can vary greatly between years of drought and normal rainfall years. On the other hand, opium poppy has a higher resistance to drought than wheat (IRIN, 2004), which makes opium production, during drought years, not to suffer to the same extent as wheat production. Hence, when faced with a harsh climate, with unpredictable rainfall and frequent droughts, Afghani farmers, especially outside the “wheat belt” may prefer the more resistant crop.

            Irrigation can offset some of the difficulties of growing wheat and make it more secure as a source of livelihood for Afghanis. Wheat production in Afghanistan increases dramatically with an irrigation system. The yield per hectare are three times larger in irrigated rather than in rainfed fields (Chabot and Dorosh, 2007). The presence of irrigation then, can triple a wheat’s farmer income.

Source: Famine Early Warning System                                                                                                                                                                                   Helmand is in souther Afghanistan (Maps of the World, 2007)

As the first image indicates, international aid agencies claim that the supply of irrigation exceeds its demand nationally (Famine Early Warning Systems, 2007). However, this image may overstate irrigation in the country. In the Province of Helmand (see second map above), the northern districts do not have access to irrigation and have seventy percent of the cultivated land devoted to opium, while the central districts, which are irrigated by the Helmand river, have 46% of the cultivated land devoted to opium poppy (Masfield, 2002). The disparity of opium poppy production in both areas may indicate that the choice of crops is highly influenced by the presence of irrigation systems that increases wheat’s production and gives confidence to Afghan farmers that their crop has a higher chance of succeeding.

            Economic constraints such as farm-gate prices and access to credit also influence farmer’s crop decision. Opium poppy’s income per hectare is 27 times greater than wheat’s income (World Bank, 2005). An Afghani farmer is then faced with a decision to plant a legal crop that will generate a considerable smaller income  or the illegal crop. As Mahbub, a local opium poppy grower stated:

“There is no way I will stop growing poppies unless you can offer me an alternative crop which will give me the same amount of money” (IRIN, 2004)

In this way, income level motivates farmers to produce the higher priced commodity, which in turn increases the ratio of opium poppy cultivation over wheat.

The availability of credit for opium poppy growers that does not exist for wheat farming is also an important factor for crop decision. Opium poppy traffickers normally provide credit for farmers in the inter-production period for future production (World Bank, 2005). However, this credit is usually denominated in opium quantity, such as for a landowner in Laghman who received a 400 dollars loan for seven kilograms of opium poppy (Mansfield, 2004). The loan repayment determined in opium quantity pushes farmers to opium production for debt repayment.

Government policy in Afghanistan has been unsuccessful in curbing opium production and promoting wheat, because of the lack of government presence in the provinces and no assistance for farmers who had their crops eradicated. The Taliban’s 2001 opium poppy ban successfully reduced the production of opium in the country during 2001, but also generated high gains for those who successfully violated the law, who received up to 300 dollars per kg of opium (World Bank, 2005). After the Taliban collapsed, the new Afghani government diminished its presence nationally. In a survey between 2002/2003 up to forty-seven percent of farmers believed that the Afghani government did not have enough control over the provinces to continue the opium ban (Mansfield, 2004). The combination of weak and discredited government institutions and high prices probably played a large role in the rebate on opium poppy production in Afghanistan as can be seen in the photos below:

Opium production in 2000, 2001 and 2002 (shades of red indicate presence in the region of the country) (IRIN, 2004)

In addition, even when the Afghani government successfully eradicates opium poppy from farms, the elimination is only temporary. Farmers replant opium as there is no government aid to eliminate the debt they have incurred from traffickers. For example, a farmer in Achin who had his opium crops eradicated by the government still owed 7200 dollars and was forced to trade his daughter, for 3200 dollars and mortgage his land for the extra 4000 dollars. He then claimed that he needed to plant opium to repay his debt (Mansfield, 2004). Weak government presence in the provinces undermines the threat of loss production to farmers, while government eradication when successful does not solve the debt problem that forces farmers to grow more opium.   

In Afghanistan, when farmers decide which crop to grow, their decision-process encompasses political, economical and climatic factors. This complexity indicates that government policy, and international support and aid need to produce multi-faceted programs to influence crop decision in favor of wheat. Only a program that takes in consideration the difficulties of being a farmer in Afghanistan and assesses their needs will be able to curtail drug production in the country.

References

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"Bitter-Sweet Harvest: Afghanistan's New War." In Web Special on the threat of opium to Afghanistan and the region: IRIN, 2004.

Chabot, Philippe, and Paul A. Dorosh. "Wheat Markets, Food Aid and Food Security in Afghanistan." Food Policy 32 (2007): 334-53.

Famine Early Warning Systems Network USAID, 2007 [cited 4th December 2007 2007].

Fazey, Cindy. "Responding to the Opium Dilemma." In Building a New Afghanistan, edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007.

Kamminga, Jorrit. "Agricultural Aspects of Afghanistan's Opium Economy." The Senlis Council.

Mansfield, David. "The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality_Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan." In International Conference on Alternative Development in drug control and cooperation. Feldafing, 2002.

———. "What Is Driving Opium Poppy Cultivation? Decision Making Amongst Opiumm Poppy Cultivators in Afghanistan in the 2003/4 Growing Season." In Second Technical Conference on Drug Control Research: UNODC/ONDCP, 2004.

NCDC. Climate of Afghanistan NOAA, 2007 [cited 20th November 2007 2007].

Pain, Adam, and Sue Lautze. "Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan." In Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Issues Paper: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2002.